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Abstract 
Due to its emphasis on diminishing race and avoiding racial discourse, color blind racial 
ideology has repeatedly been suggested to have negative consequences for modern day race 
relations. The current research examined the influence of color blindness, as well as the level of 
ambiguity of a prejudiced remark, on perceptions of a target confrontation. One hundred thirteen 
White participants read and responded to a scene depicting a White character committing a racial 
verbal microaggression of variable ambiguity, after which a target character confronted the 
comment. Results showed that the target confronter was perceived more negatively and her 
confrontation was less supported by participants with high color blindness, measured by Neville 
and colleagues‟ (2001) Color Blind Racial Attitudes Scale. Furthermore, participants with high 
color blindness tended to rate the White commenter less negatively than those with low color 
blindness. In addition, participants were affected by the microaggression‟s ambiguity regardless 
of color blindness, with a higher level of ambiguity predicting more negative perceptions of the 
Black confronter and the confrontation. Implications for how color blindness, as an accepted 
norm among White Americans that is endorsed across legal and educational settings, and 
insensitivity to ambiguous prejudice can facilitate Whites‟ complicity in racial inequality are 
discussed. 
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Color Blindness and Perceptions of Ambiguous Racial Confrontation 
In the decades since the Civil Rights Movement, the degree to which racism exists in the 
United States appears to have lessened. That is, opinion surveys have documented substantial 
changes in the racial attitudes of White Americans that suggest anti-Black sentiment is steadily 
declining (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) found that 
participants in 1998-1999 reported lower levels of prejudice than did participants from ten years 
before. Other studies show a similar overall decrease in the negative stereotypes associated with 
Blacks (Madon et al., 2001). However, there is a discrepancy between these self-reported levels 
of prejudice and the results from experimental studies that illustrate that Whites still show 
automatic negative stereotypes about Blacks and hold negative implicit attitudes towards 
individuals of different racial groups (Devine, 1989; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1999; 
Wittenbrink et al., 1997), indicating that decreases in levels of self-reported prejudice may be 
due to changing societal norms of equality (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). Researchers have 
concluded that rather than decreasing, racism may have merely changed in form and gone 
underground (Dovidio, 2001). That is, a new racism has surfaced in the United States, 
supplanting the old-fashioned racism that is commonly characterized by Jim Crow, blatant 
discriminatory acts, and beliefs in White supremacy (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). Although less overt, 
the harmful effects of this new, subtler racism are still pervasive in American culture.  
Subtle Forms of Racism 
As traditional expressions of racism have become legally and socially condemned 
(Dovidio, 2001), a major aspect of new racism is that it is more likely to be expressed when it 
can be denied to others and to the perpetrators themselves (Sue, 2010). Consequently, due to the 
“ambiguous and nebulous” (Sue et al., 2007, p. 272) nature of expressions of new racism, it is 
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characteristically difficult to pinpoint, acknowledge, or confront. Concepts such as modern 
racism (McConahay, 1986), symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2003), and aversive racism 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) have all been used to approach and understand this shift from old-
fashioned, visible racism to the subtle and indirect prejudice that is typical of post-1960s race 
relations (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2001). In the case of modern racism, which has 
received the most empirical attention (Neville et al., 2001), people high in modern racism hold 
four main beliefs as summarized by McConahay (1986): (1) racism against Blacks is in the past; 
(2) Blacks are too pushy and demanding about their rights; (3) Blacks use unfair tactics to gain 
access into places where they are not wanted; and as a result, (4) the advances that Blacks have 
made are undeserved. Those who endorse views consistent with modern racism tend not to 
engage in overt discrimination, but instead discriminate in more ambiguous situations wherein 
the behavior can be rationalized and explained, such as in a hiring context when an authority 
figure is able to provide a business-related justification (Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 
2000; Ziegert & Hanges, 2005), or in a legal context when a juror is not provided with exact 
instructions regarding how to evaluate a Black defendant (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991). Additionally, 
those who hold modern racist beliefs do not endorse extreme discriminatory policies such as 
segregation, but instead tend to consistently oppose policies such as affirmative action (Awad, 
Cokley, & Ravitch, 2004) and others aimed at repairing race-based social injustices (Blatz & 
Ross, 2009; Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, & Krosnick, 2009). 
Research increasingly shows that subtle prejudiced behavior may be just as harmful to 
minorities as blatant acts of prejudice (Dovidio, 2001). The term racial microaggressions is used 
to describe contemporary forms of racism in their everyday occurrence, expressed through “daily 
verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that 
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communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults to the target person or 
group” (Sue, 2007, p. 273). These commonplace experiences of racial inequality, of which 
ambiguity is a main characteristic, have as significant an impact on racial anger, frustration, and 
self-esteem as do experiences of traditional racism (Sue, 2007). Existing theory has proposed 
that minorities have adapted to become equipped to deal with blatant prejudice (Miller & Kaiser, 
2001), so that while overt racism may be more offensive at first, “the clear intentionality makes it 
easier to understand and ignore” (Bennett, Merritt, Edwards, & Sollers, 2004, p. 972). 
Interpreting ambiguous prejudice, on the other hand, may require greater cognitive processing, 
which leads to impaired performance on cognitive tasks as well as feelings of distress in the 
target (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). Qualitative studies have demonstrated the persistent negative 
impact of subtle racism and racial microaggressions on college students of color (Lewis, Chesler, 
& Forman, 2000; Solorzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000). Bennett and colleagues (2004) found that, 
among Black participants who were presented with either blatantly racist or ambiguously racist 
content, participants presented with ambiguously racist content who also reported high levels of 
perceived racism had the most negative affective reactions. Whites, conversely, tend to 
experience greater impairment in the face of blatant prejudice, which suggests that they are less 
sensitive to subtle levels of prejudice (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007).  
The effects of subtle prejudice extend beyond the immediate interaction between the 
perpetrator and target. The mechanics of new racism allow for the avoidance of direct racial 
discourse while simultaneously safeguarding the privileges that one racial group has over others 
(Bonilla-Silva, 2001). These consequences have psychosocial costs for Whites as well, among 
which are guilt and shame, the irrational fear of other races, distorted beliefs about race and 
racism, and limited exposure to racial and cultural diversity (Spanierman, Poteat, Beer, & 
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Armstrong, 2006). Although the effects of microaggressions on individuals have begun to be 
examined, given the importance of these ambiguous behaviors in new racism, more research is 
needed. In particular, research should further explore Whites‟ perceptions of subtle forms of 
prejudice, as Whites tend to be the main perpetrators (Dovidio, 2001). 
Color Blind Ideology 
Among the wave of post-Civil Rights racial belief systems is color blind ideology, which 
describes a specific set of beliefs that is central in contemporary racial dynamics (Bonilla-Silva, 
2002). People who endorse color blindness believe that “race should not and does not matter” 
(Neville et al., 2001, p. 60). On the surface, this attitude appears admirable and progressive; 
however, in its effort to move beyond race, it overlooks the fact that individuals often process 
information about race automatically (e.g., Devine, 1989), and that race regularly shapes 
people‟s experiences. To state that race does not matter only denies, distorts, and minimizes 
existing racism, while reinforcing the racial status quo (Neville, Spanierman, & Doan, 2006). 
Color blindness contains three dimensions as defined by Neville and colleagues (2001): 
the unawareness or denial of racial privilege, institutional racism, and pervasive racial 
discrimination. Color blindness comes predominantly from a White experience of the world, as 
the privilege of being White allows Whites to genuinely state that race is not relevant in their 
lives (Simpson, 2008). Color blindness is conceptually distinct from both old and new racism, as 
it does not necessarily indicate negative attitudes towards minorities (Neville et al., 2001). 
However, accepting color blindness‟s inaccurate view of race relations fosters inaction, which 
consequently preserves, rather than challenges, racial inequality and the structural component of 
racism (Awad et al., 2004; Bonilla-Silva, 2002; Neville et al., 2001).  
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Thus a color blind ideology is considered to be the product of a racist social structure. In 
individuals, support for color blind ideology has been positively correlated with modern racism 
and other measures of racial prejudice (Awad et al., 2004; Neville et al., 2001). Empirical 
research has repeatedly demonstrated a negative correlation between the endorsement of color 
blind ideology and support for affirmative action (Awad et al., 2004; Oh et al., 2010). Students 
who score high in color blindness are more likely to perceive their general and racial-ethnic 
campus climate to be more positive and accepting than students who score low in color blindness 
(Worthington, Navarro, Loewy, & Hart, 2008), thereby displaying an ignorance of racial 
privilege and racial conflict. 
The existing body of research, though limited, also suggests that individuals with high 
levels of color blindness are more likely to accept, and even support problematic racial behavior, 
such as participation in racial-themed party practices (Tynes & Markoe, 2010) or the use of 
inappropriate Native-American mascots (Steinfeldt & Wong, 2010). Color blindness can be 
harmful in social interactions as well, as strategic attempts to appear unprejudiced may 
sometimes backfire (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008; Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, 
Pura, & Ariely, 2006). For instance, in situations where race is salient, the cognitive effort 
required to avoid race can affect the capacity to exert inhibitory control. This may lead to 
decreased nonverbal friendliness and negative perceptions by Black observers, who see White 
participants‟ color blind behavior in a situation where race is relevant to actually indicate greater 
racial prejudice (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). Taken together, the literature demonstrates that color 
blindness, although noble on the surface, has significant negative consequences for interracial 
interactions and the perpetuation of racism, regardless of intent. 
The Confrontation of Prejudice 
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An important strategy for reducing prejudice and dealing with the negative consequences 
of prejudicial behavior is confrontation. Confrontation is defined as “verbally or nonverbally 
expressing one‟s dissatisfaction with prejudicial and discriminatory treatment to the person who 
is responsible for the remark or behavior” (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006, p. 67). A 
major benefit of confrontation is that it raises people‟s awareness of their biases (Ashburn-
Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 2008). Confrontation produces self-directed negative affect, guilt 
and discomfort within the perpetrator (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), which is important for 
successful behavior inhibition and self-regulation (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2008). Research shows 
that confrontation can also be effective in changing behavior, as participants who were 
confronted for making a prejudicial remark were less likely to make prejudicial remarks during a 
subsequent task (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006). Confrontation can be valuable to the 
confronter as well. Women who confront a sexist remark can experience a more positive self-
image (Swim and Hyers, 1999), while women who believe they should but ultimately do not 
confront sexist treatment may experience negative self-directed affect (Shelton et al., 2006).  
Unfortunately, the perceived consequences of confrontation, such as being disliked, 
dismissed, or retaliated against, can often prevent people from confronting prejudice (Shelton & 
Stewart, 2004). These concerns appear to be warranted, as confrontation can elicit negative affect 
directed at the confronter, especially when the confrontation style is hostile (Czopp et al., 2006). 
Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that targets who confront sexism or racism are 
often perceived negatively (Dodd, Giuliano, Boutell, & Moran, 2001; Czopp et al., 2003; 
Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Targets who confront tend to be seen as overreacting, rude, and 
complaining (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). They elicit feelings of 
irritation and antagonism from more prejudiced individuals (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). In a key 
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study by Dodd and colleagues (2001), although female participants liked and respected women 
who confronted a blatantly sexist remark more than women who did not confront, male 
participants disliked women who confronted significantly more than women who did not 
confront. Rasinski and Czopp (2010) found that although White speakers who confronted a racist 
comment were perceived positively by witnesses and increased witnesses‟ awareness about the 
prejudicial nature of the comment, Black confronters were perceived as rude and increased 
witnesses‟ agreement with the racist comment. Further research is needed to explore how 
evaluations of a target confronter, as well as of the person being confronted, may vary depending 
on individual beliefs and attitudes. 
The Current Research 
Social psychological research has demonstrated a shift in racial attitudes over the last 
several decades, resulting in more covert expressions of prejudice. This new racism often 
manifests through microaggressions and other subtle behaviors that may be just as harmful to 
minorities as blatant acts of prejudice (Dovidio, 2001; Bennett et al., 2004; Salvatore & Shelton, 
2007). Color blind ideology is a distinct set of racial beliefs associated with these new forms of 
racism, and has major consequences for the preservation of racial inequalities, as it allows people 
to avoid acknowledging the realities of racism (Neville et al., 2001). The evasion of race and 
racial discourse has already been found to potentially impact interracial interactions (Norton et 
al., 2006). In the current study, we were interested in investigating whether this particular racial 
ideology could be a factor in perceptions of those who engage in prejudice confrontation, a 
specific type of interaction that has significant consequences for racial minorities (Shelton & 
Stewart, 2004). The purpose of this research therefore was to examine whether color blindness 
would predict Whites‟ perceptions of a racial confrontation. Specifically, we examined 
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perceptions of the target confronter as well as of the White commenter, as studies have suggested 
that Whites who support color blind ideology may be less bothered by certain prejudicial 
behavior and those who perpetrate it (Tynes & Markoe, 2010; Steinfeldt & Wong, 2010). An 
additional goal of the current study was to examine how the ambiguity of the prejudiced 
comment affects perceptions of confrontation. There has been limited experimental research 
explicitly testing the effects of ambiguous versus blatant cues of prejudice, and even less in 
relation to perceptions of prejudice confrontation. However, some extant literature indicates that 
the ambiguity of a prejudicial situation or statement can affect the way it is subsequently 
perceived and responded to, with Whites being more reactive to blatant prejudice than 
ambiguous prejudice (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). Because of this disparity, we believed that 
level of ambiguity would be an important factor in how Whites evaluate a situation in which the 
prejudice of a remark is called into attention. Therefore, we wished to examine whether the 
microaggression‟s ambiguity would predict White participants‟ perceptions of the resulting racial 
confrontation and the two characters involved.  
In order to accomplish these two goals, a study was conducted in which White 
participants read a vignette that depicted a White character committing a verbal microaggression 
towards a Black target, after which the target confronted the commenter about the remark. The 
microaggression varied in ambiguity depending upon the experimental condition. Participants 
then responded to questionnaire items evaluating their perceptions of the confrontation itself and 
the general personality traits of the two characters. We predicted that color blindness would 
moderate perceptions of the confronter and the commenter. Specifically, it was expected that 
participants who supported a color blind ideology would perceive the confronter more negatively 
and the White commenter more positively than those who did not support a color blind ideology. 
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As little previous research has examined perceptions of targets‟ confrontation as a function of 
ambiguity, we did not have specific hypotheses but rather considered two possibilities. First, it is 
possible that color blindness and ambiguity could interact, in that participants with high color 
blindness would be more influenced by the scene‟s ambiguity, while participants with low color 
blindness, being more sensitive to racism, would respond similarly to both the high and low 
ambiguity scenes. This pattern of results would be consistent with past findings that show 
personal racial biases interacting with ambiguity to predict more prejudiced behavior when 
situations are unclear (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991; Sue, 2010), as well as with the general concept of 
color blindness as an ideology centered on not wanting to talk about race (Simpson, 2008), 
which may be difficult to maintain in the face of blatant prejudice, but easier when the prejudice 
is ambiguous and dismissible. Alternatively, it is possible that the scene‟s ambiguity would be an 
important enough factor to affect participants‟ perceptions regardless of their racial ideologies, 
so that all participants given the high ambiguity scene would respond more negatively to the 
target confronter as compared to participants who had been exposed to the low ambiguity scene. 
This pattern of results would support the literature addressing Whites‟ overall poor recognition 
of ambiguous levels of prejudice (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007), which may be a pervasive enough 
factor to overshadow the influence of individual racial ideologies. 
Pilot Studies 
Two pilot tests were conducted in order to create an appropriate vignette depicting a 
target confronting a White commenter about a racial microaggression that varied in ambiguity. 
For the first pilot test, 13 (5 male) White participants, sampled from the same population as the 
current study, read 19 short dialogue scenes, each containing a verbal microaggression 
committed against or in the presence of a racial minority. Each of the microaggressive remarks 
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was derived from Sue and colleagues‟ (2007) research on microaggressions or from personal 
anecdotal experiences of people of color shared on the website www.microaggressions.com. On 
a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely), participants rated the extent to which they found each 
remark racist, and the extent to which they found each remark ambiguous. Of the nineteen 
scenes, one was discarded due to a typing error, two were discarded for being overtly political, 
and another was discarded after participants failed to perceive the featured remark as even 
somewhat racist. From the remaining fifteen scenes, four were selected for a second pilot test 
(see Table 1 for means and standard deviations). Selection was based on the relatively high 
ambiguity ratings of the scenes‟ respective remarks, as well as the high variability in participant 
responses, which was taken to also be indicative of the remarks‟ ambiguity. 
For the second pilot test, the four selected scenes were modified to contain unambiguous 
versions of the original microaggressions, producing eight scenes in total. One group of 
participants (n = 21) responded to two of the low ambiguity scenes and two of the high 
ambiguity scenes, once again rating how racist and ambiguous they perceived the highlighted 
remark to be. A second group (n = 11) responded to the remaining four scenes. The final scene 
that was chosen for the following studies earned significantly different racism ratings between 
participants who read the low ambiguity version (M = 6.27, SD = 1.01) and participants who read 
the high ambiguity version (M = 5.00, SD = 1.45); t(30) = 2.60, p = .015. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred thirteen (43 male) White undergraduate students from the College of 
William and Mary participated in the study. Ages ranged from 17 to 28 (M = 18.77, SD = 1.45). 
Participants were given partial course credit for their Introduction to Psychology course in 
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exchange for participation. All procedures were approved by the William and Mary human ethics 
committee, and informed consent was signed by each participant. 
Participants were recruited from Introduction to Psychology courses based on their score 
on the CoBRAS scale (described below) that was administered during a mass testing session. 
Participants were recruited from the top and bottom third of the CoBRAS score distribution of 
349 undergraduate students (M = 68.91, SD = 14.56). Participants with the lowest reported 
CoBRAS scores (n = 57) comprised one experimental group, with scores ranging from 30 to 64 
(M = 53.12, SD = 6.74). Participants with the highest reported CoBRAS scores (n = 56) 
comprised the second experimental group, with scores ranging from 74 to 111 (M = 87.14, SD = 
9.62). 
Measures 
CoBRAS. The Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (Neville et al., 2001) was used to 
measure color blind ideology (see Appendix 1). The CoBRAS is a self-report scale that assesses 
color blind racial attitudes based on three dimensions: awareness of racial privilege (e.g., “White 
people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin”), institutional 
discrimination (e.g., “Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against 
white people”), and blatant racial issues (e.g. “Social problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated 
situations”). The CoBRAS consists of 20 items, each of which is rated on a Likert scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate a greater level of support for 
color blind racial ideology. The CoBRAS was administered to Introduction to Psychology 
students through mass testing during the beginning of the semester, rather than during the study 
itself, to prevent participants from deducing the study‟s true purpose. Students were then 
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recruited to participate based on their CoBRAS scores, to ensure that the study‟s participants 
represented individuals who held strong or weak color-blind ideology. 
Materials and Procedure 
A 2 (CoBRAS Score: High or Low) x 2 (Ambiguity: High or Low) between-subjects 
design was employed to examine whether perceptions of a target confronter and the White 
commenter would vary with color-blindness orientation and the ambiguity of the comment. 
Prior to arriving, each participant was systematically assigned to either the high or low 
ambiguity condition. Assignment was semi-random, in that care was taken to ensure that each 
experimental group would have a comparable number of individuals who scored high and low on 
the CoBRAS. Participants arrived in groups of four and were seated at individual computers with 
privacy screens. They were then given instructions stating that they would be completing an 
online survey about perceptions of conflicts that occurred commonly among college students. 
Participants were asked to read and evaluate three scenes, each involving a conflict between two 
individuals that ended with one character (i.e. the confronter) confronting the other (i.e. the 
commenter). The first two scenes were included to obscure the study‟s specific interest in racial 
confrontation. The first depicted a pair of female college students discussing a third friend‟s 
habit of flaunting her money, and the second depicted two male college students arguing over a 
misogynistic insult.  
The third scene, which was the scene of interest, depicted a target‟s confrontation of a 
verbal racial microaggression of either high or low ambiguity. The scene, chosen based on the 
results of prior pilot tests detailed above, was described to participants as follows:   
 
Heather is driving her friend, Fatima, to the salon to get a haircut.  
COLOR BLINDNESS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONFRONTATION  15 
 
Heather: I think I need a haircut too. My bangs are getting out of control. 
Fatima: You should do it. Maybe you could try something new and go 
really short. Get one of those pixie cuts. 
Heather: Oh my god, can you imagine? I would look like a twelve year 
old boy.  
 
At a stoplight, Heather reaches over to touch Fatima’s hair. 
 
The situation was introduced as such for participants in all conditions. The 
ambiguity of the microaggressive comment was manipulated as follows:  
 
High Ambiguity Condition 
Heather: I feel bad for you. Your hair will always feel like a bad perm. 
 
Low Ambiguity Condition 
Heather: I feel so bad for you people. Your hair will always feel like a 
bad perm. 
 
After either of these comments, the following confrontation was presented: 
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Fatima: Wow, that was really offensive. The subject of natural black hair 
is still super political, you know that right? Seriously, go easy on the 
racism there. 
 
After each of the three scenes, participants completed a questionnaire evaluating their 
perceptions of the confrontation itself as well as the two characters. All three scenes‟ respective 
questionnaires were identical. 
First, participants were asked, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much): “Was it 
difficult to determine the level of offensiveness of [Character A]‟s underlined statement?” 
Participants‟ responses served as a manipulation check of the microaggressive remark‟s differing 
ambiguity level across the two scene conditions.  
A 4-item scale assessed participants‟ perceptions of the characters in the specific context 
of the confrontation. On a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), participants 
answered the following items in regards to both the confronter and the commenter: „How 
reasonable was [Character A/B] being in the situation?‟ „How appropriate was [Character A/B]‟s 
underlined statement/response?‟ „To what extent did [Character A/B] contribute to the conflict?‟ 
„To what extent did you sympathize with [Character A/B]?‟ The creation of these items was 
informed by Czopp and Monteith (2003), and other existing literature describing the way 
people‟s support of a confronter is often contingent on how legitimate and warranted they 
consider the confrontation itself to be (Garcia, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Ellemers, 2010).  
A 7-item scale measured participants‟ negative perceptions of the character. Participants 
indicated to what extent they found each character hypersensitive, irritating, emotional, 
complaining, abrasive, rude, and argumentative. Next, an 8-item scale measured participants‟ 
COLOR BLINDNESS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONFRONTATION  17 
positive perceptions of the characters. Participants indicated to what extent they found each 
character likable, friendly, honest, easy to get along with, intelligent, respectable, considerate, 
and moral. All items were rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked, “What led to your evaluations of 
[Character A/B]?” and were given the opportunity to provide a free-form response. 
Results 
Data from all 113 participants were used. Multiple 2 (Ambiguity: High, Low) x 2 
(CoBRAS Score: High, Low) between-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted 
in order to examine the effect of the independent variables on participants‟ perceptions of a racial 
confrontation and the confrontation‟s actors.  
Manipulation Check 
A manipulation check was conducted to ensure that the microaggressions‟ ambiguity 
varied between the conditions. An independent samples t-test showed that participants indeed 
rated the remark in the low ambiguity condition (M = 1.93, SD = 1.47) as more difficult to gauge 
than that in the high ambiguity condition (M = 2.98, SD = 1.97) condition; t(111) = 3.22, p = 
.002.  
Perceptions of the Target Confronter 
To assess participants‟ perceptions of the target confronter in the specific context of the 
confrontation, four separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted. First, participant responses to 
the question “How reasonable was [the target confronter] being in this situation?” were found to 
vary significantly as a function of both Ambiguity, F(1,109) = 10.19, p = .002, η2 = .088, and 
CoBRAS Score, F(1,109) = 8.21, p = .005, η2 = .072. Participants tended to judge the target as 
being less reasonable when they were responding to the high ambiguity scene as compared to the 
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low ambiguity scene, or when they had a high CoBRAS score as compared to a low score (see 
Table 2 for means and standard deviations). No significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score 
interaction was found. 
Participant responses to the question “How appropriate was [the target confronter]‟s 
response to [the White commenter]?” also varied significantly as a function of both Ambiguity, 
F(1,112) = 19.35, p < .001, η2 = .151, and CoBRAS Score, F(1,112) = 10.97, p = .001, η2 = .091. 
Participants tended to judge the target‟s confrontation as being less appropriate when they were 
responding to the high ambiguity scene, or when they were in the high CoBRAS score group 
(see Table 2). No significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
Participant responses to the question “To what extent did [the target confronter] 
contribute to the conflict?” varied significantly as a function of Ambiguity, F(1,111) = 14.21, p < 
.001, η2 = .116, and marginally significantly as a function of CoBRAS Score, F(1,111) = 3.58, p 
= .061, η2 = .032. Participants perceived the confronter as a larger contributor to the conflict 
when they were responding to the high ambiguity scene, or when they were in the high CoBRAS 
score group (see Table 2). No significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
Finally, participant responses to the question “To what extent did you sympathize with 
[the target confronter]?” varied significantly as a function of both Ambiguity, F(1,110) = 17.10, 
p < .001, η2 = .138, and CoBRAS Score, F(1,110) = 6.15, p = .015, η2 = .054. Participants were 
less likely to sympathize with the confronter when they were responding to the high ambiguity 
scene, or when they were in the high CoBRAS score group (see Table 2). No significant 
Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
Perceptions of the target confronter‟s negative traits were examined next. Participant 
ratings of the confronter‟s hypersensitivity, emotionality, complaining, and argumentativeness 
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were analyzed individually, as these traits have been specifically emphasized in the existing 
literature regarding perceptions of target confrontation (Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Czopp & 
Monteith, 2003). Four separate two-way ANOVAs showed a main effect of Ambiguity on 
participants‟ perceptions of the extent to which the target confronter was hypersensitive, 
F(1,111) = 9.75, p = .002, η2 = .083; emotional, F(1,111) = 7.25, p = .008, η2 = .063; 
complaining, F(1,111) = 12.57, p = .001, η2 = .104; and argumentative, F(1,111) = 13.56, p < 
.001, η2 = .111. Specifically, participants who read the low ambiguity scene tended to perceive 
the confronter as more hypersensitive, emotional, complaining, and argumentative than did 
participants who read the high ambiguity racist scene (see Table 2). A significant main effect of 
CoBRAS Score was also present. Compared to participants with relatively low colorblindness 
scores, participants who scored higher in colorblindness tended to perceive the confronter as 
more hypersensitive, F(1,111) = 12.39, p = .001, η2 = .103; emotional, F(1,111) = 7.25, p = .008, 
η2 = .063; complaining, F(1,111) = 5.67, p = .019, η2 = .05; and argumentative, F(1,111) = 
11.97, p = .001, η2 = .10 (see Table 2). No significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction 
was found for any of the four traits. 
The remaining three negative traits (irritating, rude, abrasive) were found to have high 
internal consistency (α = .91), and thus were assessed as a single variable. Participants‟ general 
negative perceptions of the target confronter were found to vary significantly as a function of 
both Ambiguity, F(1, 111) = 19.47, p < .001, η2 = .153, and CoBRAS Score, F(1, 111) = 13.15, 
p < .001, η2 = .109. Participants tended to view the confronter more negatively if they had read 
the high ambiguity scene, or if they were in the high CoBRAS score group (see Table 2). No 
significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
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In assessing participants‟ positive perceptions of the confronter, eight traits (likable, 
friendly, honest, easy to get along with, intelligent, considerate, respectable, moral) were 
combined into a single variable (α = .94). Participants‟ positive ratings of the target confronter 
were found to vary significantly as a function of both Ambiguity, F(1, 110) = 5.51, p = .021, η2 = 
.049, and CoBRAS Score, F(1, 110) = 6.62, p = .011, η2 = .058. Participants tended to perceive 
the confronter less positively if they had read the high ambiguity scene, or if they were in the 
high CoBRAS score group (see Table 2). No significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction 
was found. 
Perceptions of the White Commenter 
Once again, four separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted to assess participants‟ 
perceptions of the White commenter in the context of the specific situation. Participant responses 
to the question “How reasonable was [the commenter] being in this situation?” varied 
significantly as a function of both Ambiguity, F(1,111) = 3.98, p = .048, η2 = .036, and CoBRAS 
Score, F(1,111) = 4.57, p = .035, η2 = .041. Participants tended to judge the commenter as being 
more reasonable if they read the high ambiguity scene, or if they were in the high CoBRAS score 
group (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). No significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS 
Score interaction was found. 
Participant responses to the question “How appropriate was [the commenter]‟s 
statement?” varied marginally significantly as a function of CoBRAS Score, F(1,109) = 3.84, p = 
.053, η2 = .035. Participants tended to judge the commenter‟s statement as being more 
appropriate when they were in the high CoBRAS score group (see Table 3). No significant main 
effect of Ambiguity or Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
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Participant responses to the question “To what extent did [the commenter] contribute to 
the conflict?” varied significantly as a function of both Ambiguity, F(1,111) = 6.28, p = .014, η2 
= .054, and CoBRAS Score, F(1,112) = 5.46, p = .021, η2 = .048. Participants were less likely to 
perceive the commenter as contributing to the conflict when they were responding to the high 
ambiguity scene, or when they were in the high CoBRAS score group (see Table 3). No 
significant Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
Participant responses to the question “To what extent did you sympathize with [the 
commenter]?” varied significantly as a function of CoBRAS Score, F(1,112) = 11.92, p = .001, 
η2 = .099. Participants were more likely to sympathize with the commenter when they were in 
the high CoBRAS score group (see Table 3). No significant main effect of Ambiguity or 
Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
To evaluate participants‟ negative perceptions of the commenter, three traits (irritating, 
rude, abrasive) were assessed as a single variable (α = .84). The four traits that were specific to 
the confronter (hypersensitive, emotional, complaining, argumentative) were not examined in 
relation to the commenter. Participants‟ responses were found to vary marginally significantly as 
a function of CoBRAS Score, F(1, 111) = 3.56, p = .062, η2 = .032. Participants tended to 
perceive the commenter less negatively if they were in the high CoBRAS score group (see Table 
3). No significant Ambiguity main effect or Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction was found. 
Eight traits (likable, friendly, honest, easy to get along with, intelligent, considerate, 
respectable, moral) were examined as a single variable (α = .90) in order to assess participants‟ 
overall positive perceptions of the commenter. Participants‟ responses were found to vary 
significantly as a function of CoBRAS Score, F(1, 109) = 8.34, p = .005, η2 = .073. Participants 
tended to perceive the commenter more positively they were in the high CoBRAS score group 
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(see Table 3). No significant Ambiguity main effect or Ambiguity x CoBRAS Score interaction 
was found. 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, the current research is the first to link color blindness to Whites‟ 
perceptions of the individuals involved in a confrontation of a prejudiced comment. It is also 
among the few that helps to illuminate the role of the ambiguity of a prejudiced comment in the 
way that people of color who confront are perceived by Whites in racial situations. As predicted, 
participants who aligned more strongly with color blind ideology tended to perceive the target 
confronter less positively and more negatively, viewing her to be more hypersensitive, 
complaining, emotional, and argumentative than did participants with weaker color blind 
ideology. Participants high in color blindness also tended to be comparatively less supportive of 
the target‟s confrontation, perceiving it to be more unreasonable and inappropriate.  
Our findings support the extant research that links racial color blindness with the 
acceptance and perpetuation of racial structures and prejudiced behavior (Awad et al., 2004; 
Bonilla-Silva, 2002; Neville et al., 2001; Tynes & Markoe, 2010). Stronger color blindness 
appears to be a factor in Whites‟ minimization of target confronters and their concerns, which 
may be based on a false sense of racial egalitarianism that enables them to diminish the role of 
race in racist events and interactions. To them, efforts to call attention to racism may be as 
disagreeable as racism itself. Our findings also provide further evidence of the consequences that 
targets face when they confront prejudice. Color blindness, and potentially other racial 
ideologies, may contribute to Whites‟ negative reactions to and perceptions of a target 
confrontation. The threat of these negative reactions is what often inhibits people of color from 
speaking out against prejudice in fear of being dismissed, disliked, and further antagonized 
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(Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2008). Indeed, the current research adds to previous work demonstrating 
that the targets of prejudicial remarks who confront are perceived as rude and as complainers 
(Dodd et al., 2001; Czopp et al., 2003; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Our results suggest that these 
perceptions may be especially negative among individuals supporting a color blind ideology. 
Participants‟ CoBRAS scores also had an influence, albeit less consistent, on their 
perceptions of the White commenter. Participants who were high in color blindness tended to 
rate the commenter more positively and marginally less negatively, despite the commenter‟s 
racist remark. Though not many studies have focused on Whites‟ perceptions of those who 
perpetrate racist comments, our results are consistent with the general notion that greater color 
blindness predicts less bothered reactions to problematic racialized behavior (Tynes & Markoe, 
2010). These findings are worrisome, as they reaffirm that color blindness, in its efforts to look 
past race and racism, may actually allow racism to continue (Bonilla-Silva, 2001). Furthermore, 
while research has shown that being confronted by non-targets can have a negative impact on 
how commenters are perceived by witnesses (Dickter, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012), our results 
reaffirm that target confronters face greater social risks, and that their confrontation may even 
have a counter-productive effect on witnesses‟ perceptions of the original commenter, especially 
when the witnesses have pre-existing racial biases (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010).  
It is important to study the ways in which various racial ideologies can influence Whites‟ 
perceptions of racial confrontations, as racial attitudes have bearing on both spontaneous and 
deliberate social behavior (e.g. Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, 
& Howard, 1997; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Stepanikova, Triplett, & Simpson, 2011). Color 
blindness is of particular significance as it is regularly socialized as a norm among White 
Americans and endorsed across a range of domains, from legal to educational settings (Lewis et 
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al., 2000; Pollock, 2004; Sue, 2004). For instance, Proposition 209, introduced in California in 
1996, sought to outlaw not only affirmative action but also race-based educational programs, 
believing that the consideration of race in decision-making at all was a form of racism (Pollock, 
2004). The current study provides preliminary evidence that endorsing color blind concepts can 
have potentially negative consequences in situations involving prejudicial behavior, and thus 
suggests that steps should be taken to promote a less color blind and more multicultural approach 
to interracial relations. Research has indicated that color blindness can be reduced through 
education. Self-reported color blind ideology among undergraduates was shown to be sensitive 
to a diversity training course (Neville et al., 2000), and master‟s-level students demonstrated 
greater awareness of societal racism and attitudinal changes away from color blindness after a 
targeted multicultural intervention (Steinfeldt & Wong, 2010). Even the use of brief primes 
manipulating participants‟ perspectives regarding interethnic relations has yielded optimistic 
implications, as students primed with a multicultural perspective as opposed to a color blind 
perspective later showed greater positive regard for other groups (Wolsko, Park, Judd & 
Wittenbrink, 2000), less racial bias (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), and more positive behavior 
towards an out-group member (Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009). Given the preliminary 
evidence supporting the effectiveness of education in countering color blindness and promoting a 
multicultural perspective, a stronger understanding of color blindness and its consequences for 
interracial interactions would aid in the development of training programs that work towards 
informing people about the realities of racial tensions and privilege. 
As expected, the ambiguity of the confrontation scene was also a significant factor in 
White participants‟ perceptions of the target confronter, though not in their perceptions of the 
White commenter. When the microaggressive remark was more ambiguous in nature, 
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participants perceived the confronter more negatively and less positively, and were less 
supportive of the confrontation. Psychology research has taken care to explore the relevance of 
ambiguity in people of color‟s experiences with prejudiced behavior (Bennett et al., 2004; 
Salvatore & Shelton, 2007; Solorzano et al., 2000). However, far less literature explores the way 
that ambiguity also affects Whites and the ways in which they may respond to, permit, and 
perform prejudiced behavior themselves. There is troubling preliminary evidence that Whites 
lack the ability to register ambiguous forms of prejudice (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). As 
evidenced by our current findings, this insensitivity to ambiguous prejudice may prevent Whites 
from recognizing when a microaggression is being committed and should be challenged, and 
may instead lead them to perceive a target confronter as overreacting and being quick to take 
offense. Given that Whites are also the main perpetrators of racism in the United States 
(Dovidio, 2001), ambiguous situations can easily enable Whites to act on their prejudices (Brief 
et al., 2000), or deny a person of color‟s claims that racism has occurred (Sue et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the lack of any interactions between scene ambiguity and CoBRAS score shows 
that participant‟s perceptions were influenced by ambiguity regardless of their individual levels 
of color blindness. This may be because Whites in general, no matter how well-intentioned or 
sensitive to racism, do not have to personally cope with experiences of microaggressive behavior 
on a regular basis, and thus continue to have a hard time understanding instances of more 
ambiguous prejudice, or the point of view of a target confronting a statement that they as Whites 
could have easily ignored.   
As with color blindness, our findings on ambiguity provide additional confirmation of the 
social costs that people of color face when they confront prejudice (Shelton & Stewart, 2004). 
Taken together, the results remind us of the long, unfortunate history of people of color being 
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unable to express their racial worldviews or their personal experiences with prejudice without 
being told by Whites that they are being overly sensitive, or that their assertions have no proof 
(Sue et al., 2008). As demonstrated by the current study, this trend is still the case, especially 
when the expression of prejudice is more ambiguous and easy to explain away. Therefore, while 
researchers have suggested developing methods to help people of color better cope with 
ambiguous prejudice (e.g. Salvatore & Shelton, 2007), it is also necessary to address Whites‟ 
complicity, and increase awareness and condemnation of ambiguous forms of prejudice so as to 
prevent them from being committed in the first place. Indeed, Whites may be particularly 
effective in their own confrontation of prejudicial behavior. Research has suggested that not only 
are non-targets who confront prejudicial remarks viewed as overreacting less than targets who 
confront the same comment (Czopp & Monteith, 2003), but non-targets are also viewed more 
positively when they confront an offensive comment compared to when they do not (Dickter et 
al., 2012). Because confrontation from a non-target is just as effective as that of a target in 
preventing future prejudicial behavior in the commenter (Czopp et al., 2006), as well as more 
effective than a target‟s confrontation at increasing bystanders‟ awareness of the bias of a 
prejudicial comment (Rasinski & Czopp, 2010), Whites who confront racist comments can be 
important instruments of change, all the while enduring fewer negative consequences than 
individuals of color. 
The current research possessed several limitations. Both characters in the vignette were 
women, and the confrontation revolved around the subject of natural black hair, which may be a 
particularly gendered issue. We did not test for the effect of gender on perceptions, as the study‟s 
disproportionately larger female content would not have allowed for comparable experimental 
group sizes. However, because gender has been shown to be a potential factor in confronting 
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behavior (Dickter, Cavanagh, Kittel, & Gyurovski, 2012), as well as in general attentiveness to 
social injustices (Quails, Cox, & Schehr, 1992), it is important to continue studying the complex 
intersections of gender and race. 
 Another major limitation was in our decisions regarding how to measure color blindness. 
First, we chose to represent color blindness dichotomously, with a high scoring group and a low 
scoring group, rather than on a continuous scale. Although we do not believe this choice affected 
the significance of the results, it may have prevented us from finding or observing subtler result 
trends. Secondly, the CoBRAS scale devised by Neville and colleagues (2001), though 
commonly used, has been criticized for conceptualizing color blindness as being motivated 
mainly by dominant group interests; thus the CoBRAS may have too much overlap with scales 
of racial prejudice and modern racism to be a reliable measure of color blindness as a separate 
concept (Mazzocco, Cooper, & Flint, 2011). 
 Future research should further examine the impact of color blindness and different racial 
ideologies on Whites‟ perceptions of racial conflicts and confrontations, as well the effectiveness 
of ideological primes on those perceptions. Researchers should also investigate the way Whites‟ 
perceptions may map onto their behaviors in confrontation situations, so that the costs of 
confronting often faced by people of color can be more effectively addressed in sensitivity 
training or interventions. Finally, as prejudicial ambiguity has been repeatedly shown to impact 
race relations, researchers and educators must explore methods of sensitizing Whites to the ways 
in which subtle, elusive expressions of racism are still harmful and unacceptable.  
 As blatant, straightforward prejudice continues to decrease, microaggressions and other 
ambiguous forms of prejudice become increasingly important to study, as they are by nature 
pervasive but difficult to address. The findings from our study, taken together with the existing 
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literature, should provide further incentive for researchers to investigate the way ambiguity and 
„post-racial‟ ideologies such as color blindness may allow people of color‟s concerns to be 
written off as unwarranted overreactions. These findings suggest that Whites, who are both the 
main perpetrators of racism and the most effective confronters of prejudice, should be 
specifically educated to recognize ambiguous forms of prejudice and the social realities of race, 
so that they may contribute to the improvement of interracial relations rather than the 
preservation of inequality. 
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Appendix 
Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS) Items 
1. Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich. 
*2. Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of health care or day care) 
that people receive in the U.S. 
3. It is important that people begin to think of themselves as American and not African 
American, Mexican American or Italian American. 
*4. Due to racial discrimination, programs such as affirmative action are necessary to help create 
equality. 
*5. Racism is a major problem in the U.S. 
*6. Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not. 
7. Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem today. 
*8. Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S. 
9. White people in the U.S. are discriminated against because of the color of their skin. 
10. Talking about racial issues causes unnecessary tension. 
*11. It is important for political leaders to talk about racism to help work through or solve 
society's problems. 
*12. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 
13. Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the U.S. 
14. English should be the only official language in the U.S. 
*15. White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic minorities. 
16. Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against white people. 
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*17. It is important for public schools to teach about the history and contributions of racial and 
ethnic minorities. 
18. Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their 
skin. 
19. Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. 
*20. Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
* Starred items were reverse coded. 
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Table 1 
Pilot Test 1 Means and Standard Deviations of the Four Selected Scenes 
 Racism Rating 
(n=13) 
Ambiguity Rating 
(n=13) 
Scene Number M (SD) M (SD) 
5 4.15 (1.77) 2.85 (1.99) 
11 * 4.77 (2.17) 3.08 (2.060 
12 5.46 (1.81) 2.08 (1.71) 
19 4.00 (1.96) 3.61 (2.10) 
*This scene was eventually used for Studies 1 and 2. 
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Table 2 
Perceptions of the Target Confronter as a Function of Scene Ambiguity and CoBRAS Score 
 
 
Scene Ambiguity CoBRAS Score 
Low 
(n=57) 
High 
(n=56) 
Low 
(n=57) 
High 
(n=56) 
Item M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Reasonable 5.42 (0.24) 4.33 (0.24) 5.36
 
 (0.24) 4.39 (0.24) 
Appropriate response 5.80 (0.23) 4.36 (0.23) 5.63 (0.23) 4.54 (0.23) 
Contributing the conflict 2.81 (0.23) 4.03 (0.23) 3.11 (0.23) 3.72 (0.23) 
Sympathetic 5.65 (0.22) 4.36 (0.22) 5.39 (0.22) 4.67 (0.22) 
Hypersensitive 3.48 (0.26) 4.61 (0.26) 3.41 (0.26) 4.68 (0.26) 
Emotional 3.54 (0.23) 4.41 (0.23) 3.54 (0.23) 4.41 (0.23) 
Complaining 2.39 (0.24) 3.59 (0.24) 2.59 (0.24) 3.39 (0.24) 
Argumentative 2.86 (0.23) 4.05 (0.23) 2.89 (0.23) 4.02 (0.23) 
Negative 6.20 (0.58) 9.80 (0.58) 6.52 (0.58) 9.48 (0.58) 
Positive 40.41 (1.25) 36.29 (1.24) 40.61 (1.24) 36.09 (1.25) 
Note. Each pair of means is significantly different between conditions at the p < 0.1 level. 
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Table 3 
Perceptions of the White Commenter as a Function of Scene Ambiguity and CoBRAS Score 
 
 
Scene Ambiguity CoBRAS Score 
Low 
(n=57) 
High 
(n=56) 
Low 
(n=57) 
High 
(n=56) 
Item M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Reasonable 2.11
a
 (0.18) 2.61
a
 (0.18) 2.09
b
 (0.18) 2.63
b
 (0.18) 
Appropriate response 1.66 (0.15) 1.78 (0.15) 1.51
c
 (0.15) 1.93
c
 (0.15) 
Contributing the conflict 6.28
d
 (0.15) 5.75
d
 (0.15) 6.26
e
 (0.15) 5.77
e
 (0.15) 
Sympathetic  2.02 (0.18) 2.32 (0.19) 1.72
f
 (0.18) 2.63
f
 (0.19) 
Negative 16.00 (0.54) 15.95 (0.54) 16.70
g
 (0.54) 15.25
g
 (0.55) 
Positive 22.26 (1.00) 23.78 (1.02) 20.96
h
 (1.000 25.07
h
 (1.02) 
Note. Means that are significantly different from each other (p < 0.1) are designated with 
matching superscript letters.  
 
